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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, the State ofidaho Department of Transportation (hereafter "Department") has 
appealed the Memorandum Opinion and Order on Petition for Judicial Review entered by District 
Court Judge Brudie on March 10, 2008, in which that court vacated the order entered by Michael 
Howell, Hearing Officer for the Department, on November 3, 2007, sustaining the suspension of the 
Respondent's driving license privileges for 90 days. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The relevant facts of this case are simple, straightforward, and not in dispute. On October 
14, 2007, Moscow Police Officer Krasselt arrested the Respondent (hereafter "Ms. Bennett) for the 
crime of driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to I.C. 18-8004 and transported her to the 
Latah County Jail. (R. pp. 21-23) At the Latah County Jail, Ms. Bennett submitted to Intoxilyzer 
5000 breath test administered by Officer Krasselt. The results of said test were .090 and .095, and 
based on the results, Ms. Bennett was charged with driving under the influence and faced an 
Administration License Suspension for 90 days pursuant to LC. 18-8002A. Id. 
Ms. Bennett filed a timely request for a hearing on the Administration License Suspension 
and on November 2, 2007, a telephonic hearing was held before Hearing Officer Michael Howell. 
(R. pp. 28-32, 37-38) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -1-
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 



























At the Administrative License Suspension Hearing, Ms. Bennett testified that when she was 
given the test for alcohol concentration in this matter and she had a sinus infection. See Transcript 
Of Administrative License Suspension Hearing (hereafter "Tr.") pg. 13 In. 11. This sinus infection 
required Ms. Bennett to use an Albuterol inhaler. Tr. pg. 13 In. 13. As a result of the sinus infection, 
Ms. Bennett coughed a lot, and was coughing during the 15 minute waiting period ("I was coughing 
pretty much the whole time I was in there."). Tr. pg. 13 ln. 17-19, pg. 15 In. 9-13. Due to chronic 
bronchitis, Ms. Bennett's cough is very deep. Tr. pg. 15 In. 15-16. 
Ms. Bennett also testified that during the fifteen minute waiting period prior to Ms. Bennett 
submitting to the breath test, the officer administering the test left the room on at least two occasions. 
See Tr. pg. 14-15. When leaving the room, the officer went through a doorway, down a hallway, and 
into another room. Id. During these times, Ms. Bennett was the only person in the room. Id. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order dated November 3, 2007, Hearing 
Officer Howell sustained the Petitioner's license suspension. The Hearing Officer concluded that: 
All procedures and requirements were followed by the reporting officer pursuant to 
LC. 18-8002A or I.C. 18-8004. 
(R. p. 49) 
With regards to the issue in this appeal, the Hearing Officer stated: 
VII. 
The officer certified that he administered the breath test in compliance with the 
standards and methods adopted by the Department of Law Enforcement for the 
administration of breath tests which standards include specific directions on a 15 
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minute observation period prior to the test administration. While the driver testified 
that the officer was in and out of the room during the waiting period, no specific 
testimony was produced to show that the 15 minute waiting period was not present. 
The driver had the burden to do so if she were to successfully challenge the officers 
statement that he had properly observed the waiting period. 
VII. 
The driver testified that she was coughing repeatedly prior to taking the breath test. 
However, she did not say that she had vomited or regurgitated any substance from her 
stomach that could have affected the test. According to the Standard Operating 
Procedures for Breath Alcohol Testing, if " ... the subject vomits or is otherwise 
suspected of regurgitating material from the stomach, the 15 minute waiting period 
must begin again." The testimony of the driver that she "coughed" is insufficient to 
invalidate the test or to rebut the statement of the officer that the test was properly 
conducted. 
VIII. 
Proper procedures and standards were followed by the peace officer to insure the 
operation of the test machine to be reliable, with the results of .90 and .95. 
(R. pp. 47-48) 
Ms. Bennett timely filed a Petition for Judicial Review. (R. pp. 54-55) After briefing by the 
parties and oral argument, District Court Judge Brudie entered the Memorandum Opinion and Order 
for Petition on Judicial Review on March 10, 2008, in which the court vacated the order entered by 
Hearing Officer Howell sustaining the suspension of Ms. Bennett's driving license privileges for 90 
days. (R. pp. 70-76) 
In support of its decision, the court stated: 
"The [Standard Operating Procedures J manual requires that the breath test subject be 
monitored for a period of fifteen minutes immediately prior to administration of the 
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breath test to assure that the subject did not smoke, ingest any substance, vomit, or 
belch, which actions could render the breath test inaccurate. In the absence of a 
validly conducted fifteen-minute wait required by the manual, the hearing officer 
should vacate the license suspension because the breath test was not conducted in 
accordance with requirements of I.C. 18-8004(4), I.C. 18-8002A(7)(d)." In re 
Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 944. 
Idaho's Court of Appeals has held that the fifteen minute observation period does not 
require the officer to "stare fixedly" at the subject but does, however, require the 
officer to remain in close physical proximity to the subject so that the officer may use 
all of his senses to detennine whether a subject, has belched, burped or vomited 
during the monitoring period. In State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451,988 P.2d 225 (Ct. 
App. 1999) and State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 144 P.3d40 (Ct. App. 2006), the 
Court held the fifteen minute monitoring requirement was not met where the facts 
showed the officers had failed to stay in sufficient physical proximity to the test 
subject so as to allow them to use their sense of sight, smell and hearing to monitor 
the subject. 
The instant case is analogous to Carson and DeFranco. The evidence before the 
Administrative Hearing Officer was that Officer Krasselt left the room twice, going 
down a hall and into another room. The only evidence to the contrary was a 
computer generated form affidavit signed by the Officer that included boiler plate 
language stating, "The test(s) was/were performed in compliance with Section 18-
8003 & 18-8004(4) Idaho Code and the standards and methods adopted by the 
Department of Law Enforcement." 
The fifteen-minute monitoring period is not an onerous burden, and 
it is "a precaution that is necessary to insure the validity of the test 
results." Id. This foundational standard ordinarily will be met if the 
officer stays in close physical proximity to the test subject so that the 
officer's senses of sight, smell and hearing can be employed. If an 
officer deviates from that practice, without beginning the fifteen-
minute period anew, which is always an altemati ve in cases of 
uncertainty, the officer risks that the breath test results will be 
rendered inadmissible. 
State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 338, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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In the instant case, the Petitioner testified the Officer left the Petitioner alone in the 
room at least twice during the fifteen-minute observation period, going into another 
room down the hall. There was no credible evidence contradicting that specific fact. 
Idaho's Court of Appeals has clearly stated that a breath test has not been conducted 
in compliance with required procedural standards when an officer fails to stay in 
close physical proximity to the test subject during the fifteen-minute observation 
period. In the instant case, the Hearing Officer's finding that the breath test was 
conducted in compliance with procedural standards is not supported by substantial 
evidence on the records as a whole. As a result, Petitioner Bennett's driver's license 
suspension should have been vacated by the Hearing Officer. 
(R. pp. 73-75). 
Subsequently the Department has filed this appeal. (R. pp. 77-80). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Department has identified two issues regarding this appeal: 
1. Whether or not the Department's Hearing Officer's Decision is supported by 
substantial competent evidence. 
2. Whether or not Ms. Bennett's driving p1ivileges should be suspended pursuant to the 
decision of the Department's Hearing Officer. 
ARGUMENT 
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of department 
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's driver's license. In the 
Matter of the Suspension of the Driver's License ofGibbar, 143 Idaho 937, 941, 155 P.3d 1176, 
1180 (Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). In an appeal from the decision of the district court acting 
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in its appellate capacity under ID APA, the Court reviews the agency record independently of the 
district court's decision. Id. at 941, 155 P.3d at 1180. The Court does not substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented, instead the Court defers to the 
agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. at 941, 155 P.3d at 1180. The 
agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting 
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent 
evidence in the record. Id. at 941, 155 P.3d at 1180. 
However a court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of statutory authority of the agency; 
made upon unlawful procedure; (c) 
(d) 
(e) 
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 941-42, 155 P.3d at 1180-81 (citing I.C. 67-5279(3)). 
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B. THE DEPARTMENT'S HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
1. The Hearing Officer was required to vacate Ms. Bennett's license suspension if a 
preponderance of the evidence establishes that the test for alcohol concentration was not conducted 
in accordance with the procedures and standards established by the Idaho State Police._ 
The burden of proof at an administrative hearing regarding an administrative license 
suspension is on the person requesting the hearing and that person must prove her case by a 
preponderance of the evidence if the administrative license suspension is to be vacated. See I.C. 18-
8002A(7). 
LC. l 8-8002A(7)( d) requires the hearing officer to vacate a suspension upon a showing that 
the tests for alcohol concentration were not conducted in accordance with the requirements of 18-
8004(4), Idaho Code. 
2. Ms. Bennett's license suspension should have been vacated because the breath test was not 
performed in accordance with the procedures and standards adopted by the Idaho State Police. 
I.C. 18-8004(4) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
" ... Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining the alcohol 
concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho Department 
of Law Enforcement or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho Department of Law 
Enforcement under the provisions of approved and certification standards to be set 
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by the department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho Department of Law 
Enforcement ... " 
The Idaho State Police has adopted Alcohol Testing Regulations (herein referred to as the 
ATR's) set forth and cited as ID APA 11.03. The ATR's require (i.e. see ID APA 11.03.01.013.03) 
that tests be administered in conformity with standards established by the Idaho State Police in the 
form of policy statements and training manuals. 
The Idaho State Police has adopted Standard Operating Procedures (hereafter "SOP") for 
breath alcohol testing. On page eight, said SOPs provide in pertinent that: 
3. Testing Procedure 
Proper testing procedure by certified operators in necessary in order to provide 
accurate results that will be admissible in court. 
3.1 Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject must be monitored 
for fifteen (15) minutes. 
3.1.4 If, during the 15-minute waiting period, the subject vomits or is 
otherwise suspected of regurgitating material from the stomach, the 
15-minute waiting period must begin again. 
(Emphasis original.) 
The Idaho State Police has also adopted the Operator's Training Manual for the Intoxilyzer 
5000. The Operator's Training Manual addresses the fifteen minute waiting period on page 8 and 
instructs in part: 
Monitor the subject for 15 minutes. During this time, the subject may not smoke, 
consume alcohol, eat, belch, vomit, use chewing tobacco, or have gum or candy in 
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the mouth. If belching or vomiting does occur or something is found in the mouth, 
have it removed and wait an additional 15 minutes. 
At the Administrative License Suspension Hearing, Ms. Bennetttestified that during the 
fifteen-minute observation period prior to Ms. Bennett submitting to the breath test, the officer 
administering the test left the room on at least two occasions, and during these times, Ms. Bennett 
was the only person in the room. 
The Idaho State Police has determined that prior to a breath test, a person must be observed 
for fifteen-minutes. Idaho Courts have addressed the fifteen-minute observation period and have 
held that a valid observation period requires the officer to remain in close physical proximity to the 
subject so that the officer may use all of his senses to determine whether a subject has belched, 
burped or vomited during the monitoring period. See State v. Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 882 P.2d 
993 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 988 P.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1999); and State v. 
DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2006). In Carson and DeFranco, the Courts held 
the fifteen-minute observation period was not met where the facts showed the officers had failed to 
stay in sufficient physical proximity to the test subject so as to allow them to use their sense of sight, 
smell and hearing to monitor the subject. 
As the District Court pointed out, this case is analogous to Carson and DeFranco. The 
evidence before the Hearing Officer was that during the fifteen-minute observation period the officer 
left the room on at least two occasions, that the officer went through a doorway, down a hallway, and 
into another room, and that Ms. Bennett was left alone during these times. The officer in this case 
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failed to stay in sufficient physical proximity to Ms. Bennett during the fifteen-minute observation 
period and thus the breath test was not performed in accordance to the procedures and standards 
adopted by the Idaho State Police and the Hearing Officer should have vacated Ms. Bennett's license 
suspension. "In the absence of a validly conducted fifteen-minute wait required by the manual, the 
hearing officer should vacate the license suspension because the breath test was not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements ofl.C. 18-8004(4). LC. 18-8002A(7)(d)." Gibbar, 143 Idaho at 
944, 155 P.3d at 1183. 
3. The Department's positions are without merit. 
The failure to follow proper procedure is a perfect defense in an administrative license 
suspension proceeding. Ms. Bennett's only burden is to establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that her breath test was not performed in accordance to the procedures and standards adopted by the 
Idaho State Police - she does not have to establish that the test was subsequently deficient because 
of the noncompliance. See I. C. l 8-8002A(7)( d). Ms. Benettt does not have to show that the breath 
test was somehow tainted because of the a failure to conduct a valid fifteen-minute observation 
period. 
Ms. Bennett's testimony is not ambiguous. Ms. Bennett testified that during the fifteen-
minute observation period the officer left the room on at least two occasions, that the officer went 
through a doorway, down a hallway, and into another room, and that she was left alone during these 
times. There is nothing ambiguous about this testimony. 
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Nor did the District Court make a different factual determination than the Hearing Officer 
and place more weight on Ms. Bennett's testimony. The question of whether or not a fifteen-minute 
observation period was validly conducted is a question of law based on the facts. In this case, there 
is no evidence to contradict Ms. Bennett's testimony. While the officer certified that he administered 
the breath test in compliance with the standards and methods adopted by the Idaho State Police, this 
certification, at the very best, is a legal conclusion that is not admissible as evidence. Furthermore 
this certification was a computer generated form affidavit signed by the officer that included boiler 
plate language stating, "The test(s) was/were performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-
8004(4) Idaho Code l;lnd the standards and methods adopted by the Department of Law 
Enforcement." Whether or not the test was properly administered is a conclusion of law that the 
officer is not qualified to make. Finally, the Hearing Officer in this case misidentifies the issue. In 
his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, the Hearing Officer states "While the driver 
testified that the officer was in and out of the room during the waiting period, no specific testimony 
was produced to show that the 15 minute period was not present. The driver had the burden to do 
so if she were to successfully challenge the officer's statement that he had properly observed the 
waiting period." (R. p. 47) Contrary to the Hearing Officer, the issue is not whether the fifteen-
minute observation period was present, the issue is whether or not the fifteen-minute observation 
period was validly conducted, and as set forth above, it was not in this case because during the 
fifteen-minute observation period the officer left the room on at least two occasions, that the officer 
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occasions, that the officer went through a doorway, down a hallway, and into another room, and that 
she was left alone during these times. As such the fifteen-minute observation pe1iod was not validly 
conducted and the Hearing Officer's conclusion to the contrary is not supported by substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole and should be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Bennett respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Hearing 
Officer's decision to suspend Ms. Bennett's driving privileges. 
DA 1ED this 13th day of August, 2008. 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
By:_._._.,.._ ______________ _ 
Paul T omas Clark, a member of the firm. 
Attorn s for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13th day of August, 2008, I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
322 Main Street 
PO Box 321 
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